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T
HE CURRENT INFLUENCE OF
marketincentivesintheUnited
States is posing extraordinary
challenges to the principles of
medical professionalism. Physicians’
commitmenttoaltruism,puttingthein-
terestsofthepatientsfirst,scientificin-
tegrity,andanabsenceofbiasinmedi-
caldecisionmakingnowregularlycome
up against financial conflicts of inter-
est.Arguably,themostchallengingand
extensive of these conflicts emanate
from relationships between physi-
cians and pharmaceutical companies
and medical device manufacturers.1
As part of the health care industry,
pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers promote the welfare of
patients through their commitment to
research and product development.
Their investments in discovering, de-
veloping, and distributing new phar-
maceutical agents and medical de-
viceshavebenefitedcountlesspatients.
Mostcompaniesalsosupportcontinu-
ing medical education (CME). How-
ever, their ultimate fiduciary respon-
sibility is to their shareholders who
expect reasonable returns on their
investments. Indeed, manufacturers
are acutely aware of the conflict be-
tween patient vulnerability and profit
incentives.
Recent congressional investiga-
tions,federalprosecutions,andclassac-
tion lawsuits have brought to light
documents demonstrating how com-
pany practices frequently cross
the line between patient welfare and
profit-seeking behavior.2-4 Concerned
physicians,journalists,andfederalpros-
ecutors are exposing still other as-
pects of an unhealthy relationship be-
tween manufacturers and the medical
profession.5-7
Thesetransgressionshaveprompted
pharmaceuticalfirmstoregulatethem-
selves more stringently. That effort is
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Conflicts of interest between physicians’ commitment to patient care and
the desire of pharmaceutical companies and their representatives to sell their
products pose challenges to the principles of medical professionalism. These
conflicts occur when physicians have motives or are in situations for which
reasonable observers could conclude that the moral requirements of the phy-
sician’s roles are or will be compromised. Although physician groups, the
manufacturers, and the federal government have instituted self-regulation
of marketing, research in the psychology and social science of gift receipt
and giving indicates that current controls will not satisfactorily protect the
interests of patients. More stringent regulation is necessary, including the
elimination or modification of common practices related to small gifts, phar-
maceuticalsamples,continuingmedicaleducation,fundsforphysiciantravel,
speakers bureaus, ghostwriting, and consulting and research contracts. We
propose a policy under which academic medical centers would take the lead
in eliminating the conflicts of interest that still characterize the relationship
between physicians and the health care industry.
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ior is a large part of the problem and
industry efforts to date have not
resolved the crisis. The standing of
the profession, as much as the integ-
rity of the pharmaceutical and medi-
cal device industries, is jeopardized
by allowing obvious conflicts to
continue.
The serious threat that this state of
affairsposesforprofessionalism,andfor
the trust that patients have in physi-
cians, makes the need for effective
guidelines on industry-physician rela-
tionships both apparent and urgent.
Marketing and market values should
not be allowed to undermine physi-
cians’commitmenttotheirpatient’sbest
interest or to scientific integrity.
To remedy the situation and pre-
vent future compromises to profes-
sionalintegrity,academicmedicalcen-
ters (AMCs) must more strongly
regulate, and in some cases prohibit,
many common practices that consti-
tute conflicts of interest with drug
and medical device companies. The
guidelines we suggest are designed to
promote broader professional self-
regulation.
Why AMCs?
Academic medical centers, which in-
clude medical schools and their affili-
ated hospitals, should provide leader-
ship for medicine in the United States.
Just as pharmaceutical manufacturers
looktoAMCsforinfluentialadviceand
support, so does the medical profes-
sion. Academic medical centers also
have a major responsibility for train-
ing medical students and house staff.
Researchrevealsthatthehabitslearned
oracquiredduringtrainingpersistinto
practice.8Objectivityandscientificin-
tegrityshouldbecentraltenetsofphy-
sician training.
Academicmedicalcentersarealsoin
a position to take immediate action.
They are sufficiently well organized to
gaincommitmentstoasetofnewprin-
ciples in relatively short time. More-
over,independentresearchintotheim-
pact of medications and devices on
population health is concentrated
in AMCs; therefore, unwarranted in-
fluence by manufacturers must be
avoided. For these reasons, academic
medicineshouldtaketheleadershipin
reforms, and other physicians and
medicalinstitutionsshouldadopttheir
standards.
Defining Conflicts of Interest
With Industry
Conflicts of interest occur when phy-
sicians have motives or are in situa-
tions for which reasonable observers
couldconcludethatthemoralrequire-
mentsofthephysician’srolesareorwill
be compromised. In terms of industry
influences, financial conflicts of inter-
estoccurwhenphysiciansaretempted
todeviateordodeviatefromtheirpro-
fessional obligations for economic or
other personal gain.9 The bias thus in-
troduced violates both the best inter-
estsofpatientsandthestandardsofsci-
entificintegrity.Policingsuchconflicts
clearly lies within the scope of profes-
sional responsibilities set forth in the
Physician Charter on Medical Profes-
sionalism.10,11
Traditionally,marketingbypharma-
ceuticalanddevicecompanieshascen-
tered on company representatives or
“detail persons” who visit individual
physiciansandprovideinformationon
new products. This practice has in-
creased in scale and many other mar-
ketingstrategiesarealsoused.Approxi-
mately90%ofthe$21billionmarketing
budget of the pharmaceutical indus-
try continues to be directed at physi-
cians,despiteadramaticincreaseindi-
rect-to-consumeradvertising.12In2000,
for example, the industry sponsored
314000 events specifically for physi-
cians.13 Moreover, industry con-
tracted with many hundreds of physi-
cians to serve on advisory boards or
speakers bureaus.5 The purpose be-
hind such industry contacts with phy-
sicians is unmistakable: drug compa-
niesareattemptingtopromotetheuse
of their products.
Thefollowinglist,whilenotexhaus-
tive,indicatestheinteractionswithin-
dustry that must be addressed14: gifts,
even of relatively small items, includ-
ing meals; payment for attendance at
lecturesandconferences,includingon-
line activities; CME for which physi-
cianspaynofee;paymentfortimewhile
attendingmeetings;paymentfortravel
to meetings or scholarships to attend
meetings;paymentforparticipationin
speakers bureaus; the provision of
ghostwritingservices;provisionofphar-
maceutical samples; grants for re-
search projects; and payment for con-
sulting relationships.
These interactions have been exam-
ined by a variety of physician and in-
dustry groups, including the Ameri-
canMedicalAssociation,theAmerican
College of Physicians, the Accredita-
tion Council for Continuing Medical
Education(ACCME),andthePharma-
ceuticalResearchandManufacturersof
America.2 The Office of the Inspector
General of the Department of Health
and Human Services has also released
guidelines endorsing the Pharmaceu-
tical Research and Manufacturers of
America code.
In our view, the guidelines pro-
duced by these various groups and or-
ganizations are not sufficiently strin-
gent and do not adequately uphold a
professional commitment to patient
welfareandresearchintegrity.Noneof
these groups establishes monitoring
mechanisms or pinpoints responsibil-
ity for compliance. The profession it-
self must exert much tighter control
over the relationships between manu-
facturers and physicians.
Myths of the Small Gifts
and Full Disclosures
Most of the recommendations from
medical and industry groups share 2
keyassumptions.Thefirstisthatsmall
giftsdonotsignificantlyinfluencephy-
sicianbehavior.Thesecondisthatdis-
closure of financial conflicts is suffi-
cient to satisfy the need to protect
patients’interests.Althoughthese2as-
sumptions are widely accepted among
physicians, compelling research find-
ings using a variety of methods have
called their validity into question.
Psychologists, sociologists, and
economists have explored human be-
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novative experimental techniques.15
Theirresearchhasestablishedthatbe-
haviorisnotentirelyrational,individu-
alsarenotalwaysconsciousoftheirmo-
tives, and many popular beliefs about
how individuals act in light of specific
information are simply wrong.16
Social science research demon-
strates that the impulse to reciprocate
for even small gifts is a powerful influ-
ence on people’s behavior. Individu-
als receiving gifts are often unable to
remain objective; they reweigh infor-
mationandchoicesinlightofthegift.17
So too, those people who give or ac-
cept gifts with no explicit “strings at-
tached” still carry an expectation of
some kind of reciprocity.17 Indeed, re-
searchers suggest that the expectation
of reciprocity may be the primary mo-
tive for gift-giving.15
Researchers have specifically stud-
iedindustrygiftstophysicians.Receiv-
ing gifts is associated with positive
physicianattitudestowardpharmaceu-
ticalrepresentatives.18,19Physicianswho
request additions to hospital drug
formularies are far more likely to have
accepted free meals or travel funds
fromdrugmanufacturers.20Therateof
drug prescriptions by physicians in-
creasessubstantiallyaftertheyseesales
representatives,21 attend company-
supported symposia,22 or accept
samples.23,24 The systematic review of
themedicalliteratureongiftingbyWa-
zana25foundthatanoverwhelmingma-
jority of interactions had negative re-
sults on clinical care.
Theassumptionthatdisclosuretopa-
tients is sufficient to resolve problems
created by physicians’ conflicts of in-
terest is also unfounded. First, physi-
ciansdifferinwhattheyconsidertobe
a conflict, which makes the disclosure
of conflicts incomplete. Because dec-
larationsofconflictareusuallyunveri-
fied, their accuracy is uncertain. Sec-
ond,recipientsofinformationwhoare
not experts in a particular field often
find it impossible to identify a biased
opinion that they read or hear about
thatsubject.17Third,disclosuremaybe
used to “sanitize” a problematic situa-
tion, suggesting that no ill effects will
follow from the disclosed relation-
ship.26 Rather than eliminate the con-
flict, it is easier to disclose it and then
proceed as though it did not exist.5
More Stringent Regulation
Because gifts of even minimal value
carry influence and because disclo-
sure is an inadequate safeguard, the
guidance presently provided by the
medical profession, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, and the federal govern-
ment fails to protect the best interests
of patients and the integrity of physi-
cian decision making. For these rea-
sons,manycurrentpracticesshouldbe
prohibited and others should be more
strictly regulated to eliminate poten-
tial sources of unwarranted influence.
Gifting. All gifts (zero dollar limit),
free meals, payment for time for travel
toortimeatmeetings,andpaymentfor
participationinonlineCMEfromdrug
and medical device companies to phy-
sicians should be prohibited. A com-
plete ban on these activities by elimi-
natingpotentialgrayareasgreatlyeases
the burden of compliance. It also frees
physiciansfromdecidingwhetheragift
isappropriateandremovesaprincipal
mode by which detail persons gain ac-
cess to physicians’ offices and influ-
ence their decision making.
Pharmaceutical Samples. The di-
rect provision of pharmaceutical
samples to physicians should be pro-
hibited and replaced by a system of
vouchers for low-income patients or
other arrangements that distance the
companyanditsproductsfromthephy-
sician. The availability of free samples
is a powerful inducement for physi-
cians and patients to rely on medica-
tions that are expensive but not more
effective. Samples also provide com-
panyrepresentativeswithaccesstophy-
sicians. The increasing reliance on di-
rect-to-consumer advertising by drug
companies only heightens the tension
between current marketing practices
and good patient care.
Drug companies believe that the in-
teractions between sales representa-
tives and physicians serve several pur-
poses, which include introduction of
physicianstonewmedications,encour-
agementtousethemosteffectivemedi-
cations, improvement of the likeli-
hoodthattheywillfollowgoodpractice
guidelines, and access to medications
for low-income patients. From the
perspective of medical professional-
ism,however,farbettermethodsforse-
curing these goals exist, all of which
would be free of the pitfalls of market-
ing strategies.
Drug Formularies. Hospital and
medical group formulary committees
and committees overseeing purchases
ofmedicaldevicesshouldexcludephy-
sicians(andallhealthcareprofession-
als) with financial relationships with
drug manufacturers, including those
whoreceiveanygift,inducement,grant,
or contract. These policies would help
ensure that decision making for for-
mulary drugs and medical devices is
based solely on the best available sci-
entific evidence.
ContinuingMedicalEducation.The
widespread influence of drug manu-
facturers on current CME activities
makes more stringent regulation nec-
essary.27 Manufacturers should not be
permitted to provide support directly
or indirectly through a subsidiary
agencytoanyACCME-accreditedpro-
gram. Manufacturers wishing to sup-
port education for medical students,
residents, and/or practicing physi-
ciansshouldcontributetoacentralre-
pository (eg, a designated office at an
AMC),which,inturn,woulddisburse
fundstoACCME-approvedprograms.
This arrangement would permit the
central repository and the ultimate re-
cipients of funds to remain free from
influence by any one donor company.
To ensure accountability and to ac-
knowledge generosity, the amount of
fundscontributedandtheeventualuse
ofthefundsshouldbepostedonapub-
licly available Web site.
This policy would likely reduce the
contributions made by drug and
device companies to CME programs.
Companies acknowledge that they
carefully evaluate the market impact
of expenditures and support only
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of their products.28 Other ways of
funding CME programs will have to
be identified.
Funds for Physician Travel. Phar-
maceutical and device manufacturers
interested in having faculty or fellows
attendmeetingsshouldprovidegrants
to a central office at the AMC. That of-
fice could then disburse funds to fac-
ulty and training program directors.
Trainees would no longer be directly
dependentonindustrylargesseforedu-
cational opportunities.
SpeakersBureausandGhostwriting.
Faculty at AMCs should not serve as
members of speakers bureaus for
pharmaceutical or device manufactur-
ers. Speakers bureaus are an extension
of manufacturers’ marketing appara-
tus. Because AMC faculty have a
central role in the training of new
physicians and represent their own
institution, they should not function
as paid marketers or spokespersons for
medicine-related industries. By adher-
ing to this recommendation, academic
leaders will be upholding the principle
that faculty opinion should be data
driven and not for hire. For these
same reasons, faculty should be pro-
hibited from publishing articles and
editorials that are ghostwritten by
industry employees.
ConsultingandResearchContracts.
Becausetheprocessofdiscoveryandde-
velopmentofnewdrugsanddevicesof-
ten depends on input from academic
medicine, consulting with or accept-
ing research support from industry
should not be prohibited. However, to
ensure scientific integrity, far greater
transparency and more open commu-
nication are necessary. Accordingly,
consulting or honoraria for speaking
should always take place with an ex-
plicit contract with specific deliver-
ables, and the deliverables should be
restricted to scientific issues, not mar-
ketingefforts.So-called“nostringsat-
tached”grantsorgiftstoindividualre-
searchers should be prohibited. A
contract with no identified deliver-
ablesistantamounttoagiftandshould
be regarded as such.29
To promote scientific progress,
AMCs should be able to accept grants
forgeneralsupportofresearch(nospe-
cific deliverable products) from phar-
maceuticalanddevicecompanies,pro-
videdthatthegrantsarenotdesignated
forusebyspecificindividuals.Aslong
astheinstitutionstandsbetweenthein-
dividual investigator and the com-
pany making the grant, the likelihood
of undue influence is minimized but
certainly not eliminated.
To better ensure independence, sci-
entific integrity, and full transpar-
ency, consulting agreements and un-
conditionalgrantsshouldbepostedon
a publicly available Internet site, ide-
allyattheacademicinstitution.Thisis
importantbecausecompany-fundedre-
search is more likely to produce posi-
tive results and on occasion compa-
nies have restricted the dissemination
ofresearchresultsunfavorabletotheir
products.30
One might argue that such an ap-
proach simply transfers the pressure
surrounding financial conflicts to the
institution and, as in the case of Oliv-
eri at the University of Toronto, insti-
tutions have given in to pressure from
pharmaceuticalfirms.31Buttherequire-
ments of public access and peer pres-
sure will more effectively operate at
theinstitutionallevelandsuchapolicy
is preferable to banning all contact
between manufacturers and academic
centers.
Going Forward
The benefits of such policies may con-
vincetheleadershipofAMCsandmedi-
cal schools to adopt them. We realize
thatsomeAMCswillbeconcernedthat
voluntarily adopting more stringent
regulationsmayputthematacompeti-
tivedisadvantagecomparedwiththose
that do not.32 However, we hope their
leadership will recognize that we call
for changes in current AMC practices
thatare,inmanyrespects,modest.For
example,existingguidelinesprohibitall
giftsfromindustryexceptthosethatare
small;goingonestepfurtherandelimi-
natingtokengiftsshouldnotcausegreat
disruption and may bring greater clar-
ity.Grantsandconsultingarenotpro-
hibited but must be transparent and
subject to peer review. Although such
steps may cause significant challenges
for medical schools and affiliated in-
stitutions,students,physicians,andthe
public deserve unbiased medical edu-
cation, research, and clinical care.
Industry has good reason to accom-
modate itself to these policies and will
continue to seek assistance from aca-
demic consultants and researchers.
Commercial entities working with
AMCs cannot be pleased about the di-
minished respect and growing public
mistrust of their activities in the cur-
rent environment.
Medicalschoolsmustbepreparedto
monitor compliance and enforce the
rules we have outlined. There will be
costsassociatedwithoversightandper-
hapsadeclineofcollegialityamongfac-
ulty.Butthesenegativeaspectswillde-
pendtosomeextentontheprevalence
of violations. If AMC leaders educate
colleagues and build a consensus
around these principles, compliance
will follow.
Whatthenmighttheworldofmedi-
cine look like if these proposals are
widelyadopted?First,decisionsbyphy-
sicians on which prescription to write
and which device to use might be-
comemoreevidence-based;medicalso-
cieties’ practice guidelines might be-
come less subject to bias. A greater
reliance on objective sources for accu-
rateandup-to-dateinformationwould
also promote better patient outcomes.
Second,totalexpendituresonprescrip-
tion drugs might decline. An in-
creased use of generic products, in-
creased use of comparable but less
expensive patent-protected products,
and, in some cases, a decreased reli-
ance on pharmaceutical agents might
beobserved.Third,althoughAMCsand
professionalsocietieswouldhavetofind
alternative sources for funding pro-
grams, the absence of industry repre-
sentativesatAMCmeetingsandlunches
andincorridorswouldincreasethesen-
sitivity among medical students and
housestafftothevaluesofmedicalpro-
fessionalism and scientific integrity.
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now, with some departments prohib-
itingdrugcompanylunches,othersal-
lowing them; some hospitals permit-
tingthesalesrepresentativestoseetheir
physicians, others not. Medical soci-
etymeetingswouldalsoassumeamore
professional tone and the substance
of the programs would become more
scientific.
Ultimately, the implementation of
these proposals will substantially re-
duce the need for external regulation
tosafeguardagainstmarket-drivencon-
flicts of interest, and the medical pro-
fession will reaffirm very publicly its
commitmenttoputtheinterestsofpa-
tients first.
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